T. C. A. § 8-44-102

West's Tennessee Code Annotated Currentness
Title 8. Public Officers and Employees
 Chapter 44. Public Meetings
 Part 1. General Provisions
§ 8-44-102. Declaration; definitions

(a) All meetings of any governing body are declared to be public meetings open to the public at all times, except as provided by the Constitution of Tennessee.

(b)(1) “Governing body” means:

(A) The members of any public body which consists of two (2) or more members, with the authority to make decisions for or recommendations to a public body on policy or administration and also means a community action agency which administers community action programs under the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 2790. Any governing body so defined by this section shall remain so defined, notwithstanding the fact that such governing body may have designated itself as a negotiation committee for collective bargaining purposes, and strategy sessions of a governing body under such circumstances shall be open to the public at all times; 

(B) The board of directors of any nonprofit corporation which contracts with a state agency to receive community grant funds in consideration for rendering specified services to the public; provided, that community grant funds comprise at least thirty percent (30%) of the total annual income of such corporation. Except such meetings of the board of directors of such nonprofit corporation that are called solely to discuss matters involving confidential doctor-patient relationships, personnel matters or matters required to be kept confidential by federal or state law or by federal or state regulation shall not be covered under the provisions of this chapter, and no other matter shall be discussed at such meetings; 

(C) The board of directors of any not-for-profit corporation authorized by the laws of Tennessee to act for the benefit or on behalf of any one (1) or more counties, cities, towns and local governments pursuant to the provisions of title 7, chapter 54 or 58. The provisions of this subdivision (b)(1)(C) shall not apply to any county with a metropolitan form of government and having a population of four hundred thousand (400,000) or more according to the 1980 federal census or any subsequent federal census; 


(D) The board of directors of any nonprofit corporation which through contract or otherwise provides a metropolitan form of government having a population in excess of five hundred thousand (500,000) according to the 1990 federal census or any subsequent federal census with heat, steam or incineration of refuse; 

(E)(i) The board of directors of any association or nonprofit corporation authorized by the laws of Tennessee that: 

(a) Was established for the benefit of local government officials or counties, cities, towns or other local governments or as a municipal bond financing pool; 

(b) Receives dues, service fees or any other income from local government officials or such local governments that constitute at least thirty percent (30%) of its total annual income; and 

(c) Was authorized as of January 1, 1998, under state law to obtain coverage for its employees in the Tennessee consolidated retirement system. 

(ii) The provisions of this subdivision (b)(1)(E) shall not be construed to require the disclosure of a trade secret or proprietary information held or used by an association or nonprofit corporation to which this chapter applies. In the event a trade secret or proprietary information is required to be discussed in an open meeting, the association or nonprofit corporation may conduct an executive session to discuss such trade secret or proprietary information; provided, that a notice of the executive session is included in the agenda for such meeting. 

(iii) As used in this subdivision (b)(1)(E): 

(a) “Proprietary information” means rating information, plans, or proposals; actuarial information; specifications for specific services provided; and any other similar commercial or financial information used in making or deliberating toward a decision by employees, agents or the board of directors of such association or corporation; and which if known to a person or entity outside the association or corporation would give such person or entity an advantage or an opportunity to gain an advantage over the association or corporation when providing or bidding to provide the same or similar services to local governments; and 

(b) “Trade secret” means the whole or any portion or phrase of any scientific or technical information, design, process, procedure, formula or improvement which is secret and of value. The trier of fact may infer a trade secret to be secret when the owner thereof takes measures to prevent it from becoming available to persons other than those selected by the owner to have access thereto for limited purposes; 

(2) “Meeting” means the convening of a governing body of a public body for which a quorum is required in order to make a decision or to deliberate toward a decision on any matter. “Meeting” does not include any on-site inspection of any project or program.

(c) Nothing in this section shall be construed as to require a chance meeting of two (2) or more members of a public body to be considered a public meeting. No such chance meetings, informal assemblages, or electronic communication shall be used to decide or deliberate public business in circumvention of the spirit or requirements of this part.

CREDIT(S)

1974 Pub.Acts, c. 442, § 2; 1979 Pub.Acts, c. 411, §§ 1, 2; 1985 Pub.Acts, c. 290, § 1, 2; 1986 Pub.Acts, c. 594, § 1; 1988 Pub.Acts, c. 908, §§ 3, 5; 1997 Pub.Acts, c. 346, § 1, eff. May 30, 1997; 1998 Pub.Acts, c. 1102, §§ 1, 3, eff. May 19, 1998.

Formerly § 8-4402.

CROSS REFERENCES

Commission on aging, attendance of meetings, see § 4-3-123. 

Law enforcement personnel records, inspection by citizens, confidentiality, see § 10-7-503. 

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Key Numbers

Municipal Corporations 92. 
Westlaw Key Number Search: 268k92. 

Corpus Juris Secundum

C.J.S. Municipal Corporations §§ 232 to 233. 

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR Library

34 ALR 5th 591, Attorney-Client Exception Under State Law Making Proceedings by Public Bodies Open to the Public.

NOTES OF DECISIONS

In general 2 
Advisory meeting 13 
Chance meeting 6 
Construction and application 3 
Construction with other laws 4 
Decision by single official 10 
Discussions with attorneys 11 
Evidence 15 
Governing body 9 
Meeting 5 
Parole determinations 14 
Public body 8 
Public notice 7 
Telephone communication 12 
Validity 1 

1. Validity 

Term “to deliberate,” as used in provision of Open Meetings Act defining “meeting” as convening of governing body for which quorum is required in order “to deliberate” toward decision, is not so vague as to lead to differing opinions among men of common intelligence, and does not render Act void for vagueness. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 1; T.C.A. § 8-4402. Dorrier v. Dark, 1976, 537 S.W.2d 888, rehearing denied 540 S.W.2d 658. Statutes  47

2. In general 

Board of education did not violate Tennessee Open Meetings Act by attending gathering at superintendent's house before regularly scheduled meeting, even though superintendent may have spoken with some of the members of the board about some public business, where he did not speak individually or in a group to all of the members or even about the same topics. T.C.A. §§ 8-44-101 et seq., 8-44-102(b)(1), (c, d). Bundren v. Peters, 1989, 732 F.Supp. 1486. Schools  57

Gathering of four of seven members of Board of Education and school district's superintendent at retreat in another state, during which issue of clustering was discussed, was “meeting” for purposes of Public Meetings Act, regardless of whether any decision was actually made at retreat; it was apparent that board members and superintendent deliberated toward making decision regarding clustering issue at retreat. T.C.A. § 8-44-102(c). Neese v. Paris Special School Dist., 1990, 813 S.W.2d 432. Schools  57

3. Construction and application 

To the extent a corporation falls within any of the categories listed in Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-44-102(b)(1)(B)-(E), then the Open Meetings Act would apply to meetings of the board of directors of that corporation; additionally, a non-profit corporation whose origins may be traced to the action of a state, county or local legislative body and whose directors are authorized to make decisions or recommendations on policy or administration affecting the conduct of the business of the people in the governmental sector would constitute a public body whose board meetings would be subject to the Act. Op.Atty.Gen. No. 09-68, May 1, 2009, 2009 WL 1258488.

The presence of a legislator at a private meeting of an interest group does not make the meeting a “public meeting” within the meaning of T.C.A. § 8-44-102. Op.Atty.Gen. No. 02-131, Dec. 12, 2002.

Meetings of the Economic Development Council, a not-for-profit corporation organized by the Humphreys County Commission is subject to the Open Meetings Act, § 8-44-101 et seq. if the Council was created pursuant to some action of the county commission, and Council members are authorized to make decisions or recommendations on policy or administration affecting the conduct of the business of the people in the governmental sector. Op.Atty.Gen. No. 99-012, Jan. 25, 1999.

The Open Meetings Act applies to meetings of the commissioners of the Maury County Regional Airport Authority and also applies to meetings of the Maury County Regional Airport Authority Advisory Board. Op.Atty.Gen. No. 96-131, Nov. 14, 1996.

4. Construction with other laws 

On-site physical inspections of county jails are not ordinarily meetings that are subject to the Open Meetings Act provided the inspectors do not deliberate towards a decision in conjunction with the inspection. Op.Atty.Gen. No. 04-070, April 21, 2004.

The Open Meetings Act, § 8-44-101 et seq., renders § 49-5-512(a)(8), permitting a private dismissal or suspension review hearing by the local board of education, inoperative. Op.Atty.Gen. No. 98-111, June 12, 1998.

Despite the repeal of 42 U.S.C.A. § 2790, the Tennessee Open Meetings Act continues to apply to community action agencies such as the Upper East Tennessee Human Development Agency who are eligible to receive Community Services Block Grants. Op.Atty.Gen. No. 94-077, July 8, 1994.

5. Meeting 

Where the City of Kingsport had been conducting a search for a new city manager and a third-party consultant has met privately with each member of the Board of Mayor and Aldermen and has narrowed a list of candidates after eliciting each alderman's objections and preferences regarding the candidates, the Board has not yet deliberated toward a decision within the meaning of the Open Meetings Act. Op.Atty.Gen. No. 99-193, Sept. 28, 1999.

A high school assembly called by a principal to address the faculty and student body is not a “meeting” under the Open Meetings Act. Op.Atty.Gen. No. 99-125, June 18, 1999.

An exit conference between the State Comptroller and members of a governing body, such as a city council, to communicate the preliminary results of an audit or other investigation would not be subject to the Open Meetings Act. If the auditors from the Comptroller's Office schedule the exit conference, the conference is conducted for the limited purpose to impart information to the local government officials, and the officials do not deliberate toward or make a decision, the exit conference would not be a meeting subject to the Open Meetings Act. Op.Atty.Gen. No. 99-090, April 12, 1999.

6. Chance meeting 

If a county legislative body creates partisan caucuses and gives them the authority to either make recommendations to or decisions for the county legislative body such caucuses would be governing bodies whose meetings would be subject to the Act. If county legislators, acting as individuals, informally group themselves into partisan caucuses for the purpose of conducting political party business that is not within the authority of the county legislative body, then, in that event, the Act would not apply. The Act explicitly provides, however, that “[n]o ... chance meetings, informal assemblages, or electronic communication shall be used to decide or deliberate public business in circumvention of the spirit or requirements of this part.” Accordingly, if the discussion or deliberation in a party caucus meeting turns to matters over which the caucus members would have authority when acting in their capacity as county legislators, then deliberations should not occur unless the Act is being complied with. Op.Atty.Gen. No. 94-094, Aug. 30, 1994.

7. Public notice 

Whether posting a meeting notice on an internet site would be “adequate public notice” under the Open Meetings Act would depend on all the facts and circumstances, particularly whether that location would be one where members of the community could become aware of the notice. Op.Atty.Gen. No. 00-090, May 9, 2000.

8. Public body 

For purposes of Open Meetings Act, commonly referred to as Sunshine Law, “public body” to which Act applies includes any board, commission, committee, agency, authority or any other body, by whatever name, whose origin in authority may be traced to state, city or county legislative action. T.C.A. §§ 8-44-102, 8-44-102(b)(1). Hastings v. South Cent. Human Resource Agency, 1991, 829 S.W.2d 679, appeal denied. Administrative Law And Procedure  124

9. Governing body 

Preferred provider organization's (PPO) board of directors was “governing body” subject to provisions and requirements of Open Meetings Act so as to require that meetings of board be open to public, on grounds that PPO was subsidiary of county general hospital district, PPO's charter indicated that it was created as government instrumentality of district, PPO commingled funds with district, PPO's bookkeeping was handled by district, district appointed PPO's board of directors, and district gave PPO seed capital and line of credit. T.C.A. § 8-44-102. Souder v. Health Partners, Inc., 1998, 997 S.W.2d 140. Insurance  1256(1)

Grievance committee of South Central Human Resource Agency was not “governing body” subject to Open Meetings Act (Sunshine Law). T.C.A. §§ 8-44-101 et seq., 8-44-101(a), 8-44-102, 8-44-102(b)(1), 13-26-103(d), 13-26-104, 13-26-108(3). Hastings v. South Cent. Human Resource Agency, 1991, 829 S.W.2d 679, appeal denied. Administrative Law And Procedure  124; States  45

Meetings of faculty and state university college of law committees, which were created by the dean, which derived their authority from the dean, and authority of which was to make recommendations to dean, who was not a public body but an administrative officer, did not constitute meetings of “governing body” of public body with authority to make decisions for or recommendations to a public body, and thus were not subject to provisions of Open Meetings Act. T.C.A. §§ 8-4401 et seq., 8-4402. Fain v. Faculty of College of Law of University of Tennessee, 1977, 552 S.W.2d 752. Colleges And Universities  8(1)

Where individual college faculties at state university had no authority to affect changes in curriculum of their respective colleges nor did faculties have authority to make recommendations pertaining to curriculum of any authority outside college, law school faculty, with respect to matters pertaining to curricula, did not exercise any governmental authority nor did it have power to make recommendations to governing body that would bring its meetings within provisions of Open Meetings Act. T.C.A. §§ 8-4401 et seq., 8-4402. Fain v. Faculty of College of Law of University of Tennessee, 1977, 552 S.W.2d 752. Colleges And Universities  8(1)

Since accreditation requirement merely required that faculty have primary or initial responsibility and not final authority and such requirement was guideline, failure to totally comply with which would not result in automatic loss of accreditation, argument that state university college of law faculty had to necessarily perform governmental functions with respect to establishment of institutional policies in order to retain accreditation in compliance with university directive that all colleges be fully accredited by professional accrediting organizations did not demonstrate that law faculty was a governing body within meaning of Open Meetings Act. T.C.A. §§ 8-4401 et seq., 8-4402. Fain v. Faculty of College of Law of University of Tennessee, 1977, 552 S.W.2d 752. Colleges And Universities  8(1)

A task force committee created by an administrator, and which the Board of Veterinary Medical Examiners played no role in creating or operating is not a “governing body” within the meaning of the Open Meetings Act. Op.Atty.Gen. No. 06-105, June 26, 2006.

Tennessee School Board Association meetings fitting the definition of “governing body” under § 8-44-102 are subject to the Open Meetings Act. Op.Atty.Gen. 06-071, April 17, 2006.

The Local Government Planning Advisory Committee has determined that the Economic Development Board of Unicoi County is sufficiently similar to a joint economic and community development board; therefore the board is a “governing body” subject to open meeting requirements. Op.Atty.Gen. No. 03-091, July 24, 2003.

The Economic Development Board of Unicoi County is not a “governing body” within the meaning of T.C.A. § 8-44-102 subject to the Open Meetings Act; however, since certain members of the board are also members of the Unicoi County Commission which is a governing body, those members may be in violation of the Open Meetings Act if they deliberate county or city business during board meetings. Op.Atty.Gen. No. 03-063, May 14, 2003.

The Henry County Airport Committee is a “governing body” as defined in the Open Meetings Act;therefore, committee meetings, including job interviews, must be held in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Op.Atty.Gen. No. 96-040, March 12, 1996.

10. Decision by single official 

Sunshine Law does not apply to meetings pertaining to decisions made by single public officials. T.C.A. § 8-44-102(c). Metropolitan Air Research Testing Authority, Inc. v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, 1992, 842 S.W.2d 611, appeal denied. Administrative Law And Procedure  124

11. Discussions with attorneys 

Although school board had right to meet with its attorney in closed session to discuss pending controversy pertaining to teacher, such session was “meeting” to which Open Meetings Act applied to extent that board made decisions or deliberated toward decision. T.C.A. § 8-44-102(c). Van Hooser v. Warren County Bd. of Educ., 1991, 807 S.W.2d 230. Schools  57

Attorney-client exception to the Open Meetings Act applied to informal gathering attended by quorum of school board to consult with board's attorney concerning legal ramifications of bringing charges against principal, in view of possibility of being found in contempt of standing federal district court order to reinstate principal as principal of county high school; no action was taken by board at gathering. T.C.A. § 8-44-101 et seq. Cooper v. Williamson County Bd. of Educ., 1987, 746 S.W.2d 176. Schools  57

Attorney-client exception to Open Meetings Act was applicable to gathering of school board and attorney to discuss settlement offer made by principal in connection with dismissal; board made no decision at gathering and no preliminary deliberations were undertaken by board. T.C.A. § 8-44-101 et seq. Cooper v. Williamson County Bd. of Educ., 1987, 746 S.W.2d 176. Schools  57

Application of the Open Meetings Act to discussions between public bodies and their attorneys regarding pending litigation violates constitutional provisions defining the division of power of the state government and limitations of such powers and, therefore, discussions between a public body and its attorney concerning pending litigation are not subject to the Open Meetings Act so long as the public body is a named party in the lawsuit; however, once any discussion whatsoever begins among members of the public body regarding what action to take based upon advice from counsel, whether it be settlement or otherwise, such discussion shall be open to the public and failure to do so shall constitute a clear violation of the Open Meetings Act. T.C.A. § 8-44-101 et seq.; Const. Art. 2, §§ 1, 2. Smith County Educ. Ass'n v. Anderson, 1984, 676 S.W.2d 328. Administrative Law And Procedure  124

12. Telephone communication 

County commissioner who, upon learning of vacancy in trustee's office, contacted several of his fellow commissioners by telephone, soliciting their vote, did not violate Open Meetings Act. T.C.A. §§ 8-44-101 et seq., 8-44-102(c). Jackson v. Hensley, 1986, 715 S.W.2d 605. Counties  52

13. Advisory meeting 

Open meeting requirement of Sunshine Law did not apply to meeting of city officials held for purpose of providing purchasing agent with their opinions concerning whether he should award contract to company that submitted lowest bid; group was not required to have a quorum or to deliberate, or to make recommendations to a public body, and purchasing agent could have made decision without the meeting. T.C.A. § 8-44-102(c). Metropolitan Air Research Testing Authority, Inc. v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, 1992, 842 S.W.2d 611, appeal denied. Municipal Corporations  241

14. Parole determinations 

Members of Board of Paroles did not violate Open Meetings Act by individually considering and voting upon parole requests, based on record prepared by hearing officer, without holding meeting; enabling statute did not require meeting in connection with parole determinations. West's Tenn.Code, §§ 8-44-102(a), 40-28-105. Arnold v. Tennessee Bd. of Paroles, 1997, 956 S.W.2d 478. Pardon And Parole  59

Consideration of a request made personally to members of the Parole Board by a law enforcement agent requesting the involvement of parolees as informants in ongoing investigations is subject to the Open Meetings Act even if the information being discussed involves highly confidential information which, if made public, could result in harm to an individual. Op.Atty.Gen. No. 95-010, March 3, 1995.

15. Evidence 

Evidence in suit by chief of police challenging action of board of aldermen in failing to reappoint chief of police supported finding that there was no violation of Open Meetings Act in discussions between mayor and aldermen concerning the procedure for reappointing chief of police and possibility of placing the plaintiff with the fire department. T.C.A. §§ 8-44-101, 8-44-102. Dingman v. Harvell, 1991, 814 S.W.2d 362, appeal denied. Municipal Corporations  182

T. C. A. § 8-44-102, TN ST § 8-44-102

Current through end of 2010 First Ex. Sess. and with laws from 2010 Reg. Sess., eff. through June 9, 2010

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